Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has emerged over the past decade as an accelerating challenge to health, development and security agendas. While often framed as a technical matter, AMR is in fact a structural phenomenon directly shaped by how societies organize their health systems, food production, environmental regulation, and international cooperation. In this respect, it resembles other cross‑border challenges that have forced policymakers to rethink traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy, with consequences that are particularly pronounced in low and middle-income countries where health systems are already under strain.
The G7 Summit in Evian comes at a moment when this structural dimension of AMR is increasingly evident. The adoption of a political declaration on AMR at the United Nations General Assembly on 2024 and the recent One Health Summit during April in Lyon have both acknowledged that the continued erosion of antimicrobial effectiveness threatens to reverse gains in life expectancy, productivity and poverty reduction. However, as with many global health issues, there remains a gap between the scale of the commitments made and the pace at which they are translated into implementation on the ground.
The Health Diplomacy Alliance views health as both an outcome of, and a contributor to, broader patterns of stability and cooperation. AMR illustrates this dual role. On the one hand, rising resistance directly affects the ability of health systems to deliver, thus eroding public trust when health services can no longer provide effective treatment for common infections. On the other hand, the way governments, international organizations and private actors respond to AMR signals the reliability of global cooperation and the value placed on prevention.
Recent discussions at Lyon One Health summit have reinforced the understanding that AMR cannot be addressed in isolation from its wider One Health context. Therefore, in light of these developments, this commentary identifies areas where sustained G7 engagement, coordinated with other partners, could have substantial impact if it is sustained over time.
1- AMR must be recognized as a strategic global risk
There is a case for G7 governments to treat AMR as a core strategic risk, by integrating it into national security strategies, development cooperation frameworks and climate policies rather than confining it to health ministries alone. Doing so would recognize that resistance undermines not only clinical outcomes, but also economic resilience, trade, and the functioning of health systems in crisis settings.
2- Political commitments and implementation
G7 countries are well placed to support and close the implementation and financing gap that continues to limit the effectiveness of many national AMR action plans. This does not imply substituting for domestic responsibility, but highlighting on existing mechanisms, such as development banks, the Pandemic Fund and other global health instruments to support investments in primary health care, laboratories, surveillance and workforce development that are essential for both AMR and broader health security. A shared objective, for example, that by 2030 a majority of countries have fully costed, and partially funded AMR plans aligned with One Health principles, would offer a useful point for such efforts and enable more systematic monitoring of progress over time.
3- Closing financing gaps - for national AMR Plans
The G7 is well positioned to lend political and financial support to the development of integrated One Health governance for AMR. Many national AMR action plans exist on paper, but too few are fully costed, funded and operationalized. The G7, could support predictable financing for laboratories, surveillance, primary care, workforce development and infection prevention, especially in low and middle-income countries where the burden of resistance is compounded by broader weaknesses in health systems.
4- Building interoperable One Health surveillance, diagnostics and data systems
Attention should be given to surveillance and data. The One Health Data Convergence initiatives launched in Lyon specifically stress the need for systems that connect human, animal, and environmental information in usable ways. Such support should be designed in a way that strengthens national institutions rather than creating parallel structures and could include investments in the analytical and policy capacities needed to interpret and act on the data generated. Support for diagnostics capacity and analytical expertise would make it possible to detect resistance earlier and to respond more effectively.
5- Ensure AMR policies prioritize civil‑society engagement
Any meaningful response to AMR will depend on structured engagement with civil society organizations and other community actors who can connect scientific evidence with practice. CSOs are already supporting AMR efforts in areas such as awareness‑raising, behavior change, surveillance, and monitoring of policy commitments, but their potential contributions to implementation and knowledge generation are still underutilized. Involving CSOs, youth groups and local authorities in the co‑design of interventions, community‑based research and implementation science can help ensure that AMR policies are grounded in real‑world experience and that scientific guidance is adapted to local contexts.
The AMR issue is important because it exposes the limits of fragmented responses and the need for a more integrated approach to health, development, and diplomacy.
Closer alignment between political commitments with financing, governance, and implementation would strengthen the international response to AMR and reinforce the practical relevance of One Health approach. The Health Diplomacy Alliance will continue to follow this development with interest and reflect it on its Check the Box Initiative.
